Climate Engagement in a Digital Age: Exploring the Drivers of Participation in Climate Discourse Online in the Context of COP21 by Arlt, Dorothee et al.
1 
 
Title Page 
 
Title of Manuscript. Climate Engagement in a Digital Age: Exploring the Drivers of 
Participation in Climate Discourse Online in the Context of COP21  
 
Abstract  
Various scholars underscore the importance of public engagement with climate change to 
successfully respond to the challenges of global warming. However, although online media 
provide various new opportunities to actively engage in climate discourse through sharing, 
evaluating or publishing climate-related content online, so far very little is known about the 
drivers of public participation in climate discourse online. Against this background this study 
tested a theoretical model on the effects of media and interpersonal communication on 
participation in climate discourse online using data from a representative online survey of 
German citizens (n=1,392) carried out while the climate summit in Paris 2015. Over all, the 
results show that receiving information on climate change from social media (social networks, 
Twitter, blogs), active information seeking online, and interpersonal conversations about 
COP21 strongly encourage participation in climate discourse online. Moreover, results 
provide relevant insights on the role of interest in climate politics, personal issue relevance 
and climate scepticism as preconditions of communication effects. 
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Climate Engagement in a Digital Age: Exploring the Drivers of Participation in Climate 
Discourse Online in the Context of COP21  
Climate change is undoubtedly one of the greatest societal challenges of our time. The need to 
take global action was first recognized in the early 90s with the establishment of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Today, the scientific 
community has reached a widely accepted consensus regarding the anthropogenic causes and 
negative impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2013), although some questions remain open (e.g. 
the role of clouds; Bony et al., 2016). Nonetheless, scientific assessments of climate impacts 
are strongly related to political, societal and technological developments, as they are often 
used to anchor public debate about climate change and to justify political climate goals, such 
as the two-degree target (e.g. Knutti, Rogelj, Sedlacek, & Fischer, 2016). Moreover, even 
now, the communicative context of global warming can be described as an ongoing debate 
reflecting various kinds of arguments, positions and controversies (Wibeck, 2014). Therefore, 
the adoption of collective climate actions is often hindered, and sometimes even intentionally 
prevented, by the conflicting interests of the various actors involved in that debate. Not 
without reason, it took the Parties of the UNFCCC over two decades to reach the first 
universal, legally binding global climate deal, the Paris Agreement, at the climate conference 
in December 2015. 
Given that, a growing number of scholars argue that responding to global warming will not be 
successful unless the public is also engaged with climate change (e.g., Wibeck, 2014). Thus, 
public engagement with climate change has been defined both as people’s political 
engagement with climate political matters (Carvalho, van Wessel, & Maeseele, 2016; 
Feldman, Hart, Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2015; Roser-Renouf, Maibach, 
Leiserowitz, & Zhao, 2014) and as ‘a personal state of connection with the issue of climate 
change’ (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007, p. 446; Whitmarsh, Seyfang, & 
O’Neill, 2011; Wolf & Moser, 2011).  
 
In order to encourage public engagement with climate change in any form, scholars stress the 
importance of communicating about the causes, impacts and possible solutions (Moser, 2009, 
2010; Nisbet, 2009). Therefore, scholars have examined the effects of communication on 
public engagement and aimed to identify strategies of effective climate communication 
(Wibeck, 2014). Previous research on the effects of communication on behavioural 
engagement with climate change mainly focused on the effects of political and issue-specific 
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media. Moreover, this research dealt with the impact of communication on climate protection 
by taking mitigation actions in everyday life (Arlt, Hoppe, & Wolling, 2011; Cabecinhas, 
Lázaro, & Carvalho, 2008) on the one hand and on political climate activism on the other 
hand (Feldman et al., 2015; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014). However, although scholars from 
political communication research underline the relevance of online media for public 
engagement, current climate research mainly focusses on the content and structure of climate 
discourse in online media (e.g. Elgesem, Steskal, & Diakopoulos, 2015; Jang & Hart, 2015; 
Matthews, 2015; Sharman, 2014; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Hugo Lambert, 2015). 
Consequently, to date very little is known about the drivers of public participation in climate 
change discourse online. The only exception, as far as we are concerned, is a recent study by 
Taddicken and Reif (2016), who developed a typology of Germans’ online engagement with 
climate change by applying cluster analysis to survey data from autumn 2013.   
 
Against this background of this research desideratum, this study aims to explore the factors 
influencing peoples’ participation in climate discourse online in the context of the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP21) held in Paris in December 2015. The annual climate 
summits do not only serve as a forum for political climate diplomacy, but also as significant 
points in time to inspire public engagement in climate discourse —either offline or online—as 
the intensity of media coverage increases enormously in the context of these political events 
(e.g. Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014; Schmidt, Ivanova, & Schäfer, 2013).  
 
Literature Review 
Participation in Climate Change Discourse Online 
In view of previous research, scholars have mainly examined three forms of offline 
participation in climate policy matters: (a) participating in demonstrations or rallies to support 
climate actions; (b) contacting government officials to urge them to take climate actions; (c) 
signing a petition to support the reduction of climate change (e.g. Feldman et al., 2015; 
Lubell, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2007; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014). However, given the growing 
importance of the internet, the number of participatory actions that can be taken online is 
steadily increasing. One the one this involves activities that scratch a shift from offline to 
online, as most of these actions are ‘converted’ forms of offline participation (e.g. e-voting, e-
petition signing, online donation, contacting politicians online or emailing an editor (Gibson 
& Cantijoch, 2013)). On the other hand, giving the growing popularity of social networks, 
various new modes of online participation such as sharing political views on social networks 
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sites, commenting posts in online forums, or publishing one’s own posts on issues have 
emerged (Bennett, 2012; Hosch-Dayican, 2014; Rojas, 2010). Hence, in view of the 
traditional conceptualization of political participation, these online activities are less 
instrumental and targeted to influence policy-making processes, but rather individualized 
forms of political self-expression (Hosch-Dayican, 2014). Consequently, we can observe an 
increasing tendency of ‘self-actualizing, digitally mediated DIY politics’ (Bennett, 2012, p. 
30) that, to a great extent, take place outside ‘the domain of institutionalized policy making’ 
(Hosch-Dayican, 2014, p. 433). Applying these thoughts to the above-mentioned study of 
Taddicken and Reif (2016), they have considered three new modes of online participatory 
activities: (a) sharing messages about climate change in social networks; (b) commenting on 
climate messages online news sites; (c) publishing one’s own climate messages on blogs.   
 
Yet, someone could argue that public engagement with climate change through such online 
activities is less significant than offline activities that are explicitly targeted at influencing 
climate policy-making processes. However, there is strong empirical evidence that 
undermines the crucial potential of online discourse to affect (offline) public opinion about 
climate change, which, in turn, may affect political outcomes. First, various scholars have 
witnessed that climate-sceptic arguments are more apparent in online media (online user 
comments: Koteyko, Jaspal, & Nerlich, 2013; weblogs: Matthews, 2015; Sharman, 2014) and 
that weblogs are even able to set the agenda of traditional mass media (Hellsten & 
Vasileiadou, 2015). Second, public discourse in online social networks is strongly polarized 
between climate sceptics and non-sceptics (Jang & Hart, 2015) and typically happens within 
polarized echo chambers, where people mostly interact with like-minded others (Williams et 
al., 2015). Third, considering the concept of opinion leadership (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & 
Gaudet, 1944), scholars argue that individuals who spread messages on climate change 
through their social networks and discuss the issue on Twitter might take over a role as 
‘digitally networked climate leaders’ (Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014; Nisbet & Kotcher, 
2009, p. 336). In turn, these digital opinion leaders can have a strong influence on some 
segments of the population (e.g. the doubtful about climate change) in which personal 
relations to family and friends are the most trusted information sources about climate change 
(Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2009).  
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Effects of Media Communication on Participation  
Initial insights into the role of media communication on participation in climate discourse 
online can be drawn from the study of Taddicken and Reif (2016). However, as the typology 
contained not only participatory activities (sharing, commenting, rating and publishing), but 
also active information seeking on climate change using search engines. In the context of the 
present study, we focus on the small group of ‘participating experts’, which represent 
approximately 2% (n=34) of the total sample of n = 1,463 (Taddicken & Reif, 2016, p. 324). 
People belonging to this group did not only participate most actively in climate discourse 
online, but they were also exposed the most to information about climate change from 
traditional mass media (e.g. public and private television, newspapers and magazines) and 
online media (e.g. online newspapers, news platforms, social networking sites, blogs).  
 
Hence, to gain a more comprehensive understanding how communication affects (online) 
political participation, we want to give a short overview about findings stemming from 
political communication research. Numerous studies regarding the effects of traditional mass 
media have reported positive effects of using newspapers on political participation (Hardy & 
Scheufele, 2005; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002), forum 
participation (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002) and civic participation (Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 
2001; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Shah et al., 2007). For television news exposure, 
however, the findings are mixed. While some scholars have explored the mobilizing effects of 
television hard-news use on political participation (Gil de Zúñiga, Veenstra, Vraga, & Shah, 
2010; McLeod et al., 1996), others could not confirm this positive relation (Hardy & 
Scheufele, 2005; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007).  
 
With respect to effects of the internet, they seem to strongly depend on the form of internet 
use. First, scholars found that seeking information online positively affects participation 
behaviours (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003) and political self-expression 
online (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010; Shah et al., 2007). Second, using the internet for 
exchanging information and interactive political messaging inspires civic participation (Shah 
et al., 2001; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). Overall, as the results of a meta-analysis of 
38 studies reveal, internet use and participation are related in a positive, but rather weak 
manner; however, the relation seems to be stronger for using the internet for information 
purposes (Boulianne, 2009). Recent studies have more strongly focused on the effects of 
social media use on participation and civic engagement. A meta-analysis of 22 studies has 
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shown that while using social media for news and information has mobilizing effects, there 
are no such effects for identity and entertainment-oriented social media use (Skoric, Zhu, 
Goh, & Pang, 2015). Moreover, informational social media use is strongly related to political 
expression online (Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2014; Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 
2014).  
 
Effects of Interpersonal Communication on Participation  
As already discussed above (political) information and news are important prerequisites of 
online and offline political participation. Besides (mass) media, communication scholars 
stress the importance of interpersonal communication as another source of information as 
individuals at least sporadically discuss political issues with friends, colleagues, family 
members and co-members of social groups. Therefore, these interpersonal communication 
networks have the ‘function to review and elaborate one’s understanding of political issues’ 
(Boomgaarden, 2014, p. 473)—often mediated by (mass) media. The importance of 
interpersonal communication to affect people’s political attitudes and behaviours was first 
recognised by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), who developed the two-step flow of communication 
model. This paradigm assumes that most individuals do not receive their information from the 
mass media directly but, instead, through interpersonal conversations with well-informed, 
politically interested opinion leaders within their interpersonal social networks. Thus, rather 
than affecting people directly, the mass media influences citizens indirectly, mediated through 
interpersonal communication. Regarding the effects of interpersonal communication on 
political participation, there is strong evidence supporting the two-step flow model of 
communication (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). Various studies have observed indirect effects of 
mass communication through interpersonal discussion (McLeod et al., 1996; McLeod et al., 
1999; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). Besides, studies discovered that interpersonal 
communication directly affects political expression online via social media (Gil de Zúñiga et 
al., 2014). Studies from the field of climate communication even explored positive effects of 
interpersonal discussion about climate change on participation in climate matters (climate 
activism; Feldman et al., 2015; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014).  
 
Preconditions of Climate-related Communication and Participation Behaviours  
However, despite the substantial empirical evidence for effects of media use and interpersonal 
communication on online and offline (political) participation, it must be acknowledged that 
communication behaviours and participation strongly depend on personal characteristics of 
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the audience and their selective exposure to information (Valkenburg, Peter, & Walther, 
2016). Likewise, studies on audience segmentation in the context of climate change have 
shown that population segments that strongly differ in their attitudes towards climate change 
also have very diverse issue-specific communication patterns. For example, US-American 
participants who doubt the existence of global warming tend to rely on their interpersonal 
communication networks as their trusted source of information on the issue, while alarmed 
citizens heavily use all types of mass media (Leiserowitz et al., 2009). Likewise, the findings 
from a typology of attitudes about climate change of German citizens reveal that those who 
are alarmed about global warming more frequently use different sources of information on the 
issue, including personal conversations (Metag, Füchslin, & Schäfer, 2015). Moreover, the 
typology of German’s online engagement in climate discourse revealed that those who 
participated the most frequent in climate discourse online, the ‘participating experts’, were 
strongly interested in the issue of climate change, but at the same time did not strongly believe 
in anthropogenity of global warming (Taddicken & Reif, 2016, p. 327). Likewise, studies that 
examined the content and structure of climate discourse online explored that people holding 
more sceptical attitudes towards climate change seem to be more actively engaged in climate 
discourses online (e.g. Jang & Hart, 2015; Koteyko, Jaspal, & Nerlich, 2013; Matthews, 2015; 
Sharman, 2014). Finally, various studies from political communication research have shown 
that people who are more strongly interested in politics show higher levels of political 
participation (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; McLeod et al., 1999).  
Research Model and Hypotheses 
As stated before, the aim of this study is to explore and explain the peoples’ participation in 
climate discourses online in the context of the COP21. Based on the previously discussed 
literature (e.g., Bennett, 2012; Hosch-Dayican, 2014; Rojas, 2010), this study focuses on 
activities that—to a certain degree—contribute, enhance, or enable public discourses about 
climate change online through sharing information or expressing one’s own views about 
climate change online (e.g., Taddicken & Reif, 2016). Regarding the effects of 
communication, previous research has demonstrated that the mobilizing potentials strongly 
vary across different forms of communication and media. Therefore, we expect differentiated 
effects. Figure 1 summarizes the assumed effects of media and interpersonal communication 
on participation in climate change discourse online. Previous research has shown that using 
the internet for news is positively related to various forms of participation (Boulianne, 2009) 
and that active information seeking online stimulates political self-expression online (Gil de 
Zúñiga et al., 2010; Shah et al., 2007). Thus, we hypothesize that participating in climate 
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change discourse online will be positively driven by reading online newspapers (H1) and 
active information seeking on climate change online (H2). Hence, based on studies that 
observed positive effects of using various forms of social media for information on online 
expression (Bode et al., 2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014; Skoric et al., 2015; Yang & DeHart, 
2016), it also seems likely to expect positive effects of using social media on participation in 
climate discourse online. Thus, to examine these effects on a more differentiated basis, we 
assume positive effects of an informational use of social network sites (H3a), Twitter (H3b), 
and weblogs (H3c) on climate-related online participation.  
 
Existing research has provided substantial empirical evidence that reading print media 
inspires—directly and indirectly—traditional (offline) forms of political participation; 
however, the mobilizing effect of TV news exposure seems to be rather mediated through 
interpersonal communication (e.g. Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; McLeod et al., 1996; McLeod, 
Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; 
Shah et al., 2007; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Bases on this rationale, we assume that 
watching television news will have a positive effect on participation in climate discourse 
online through interpersonal conversation (H4, full mediation), while reading print media will 
positively affect participation directly (H5a) and indirectly (H5b, partial mediation). 
Regarding the effect of interpersonal conversations about politics in general (e.g. Gil de 
Zúñiga et al., 2010; McLeod et al., 1996; McLeod et al., 1999) and about climate change in 
particular (Feldman et al., 2015; Lubell et al., 2007; Roser-Renouf et al., 2014), previous 
research has shown that interpersonal communication strongly motivates political action. 
Accordingly, we expect that interpersonal conversations about climate change will motivate 
participation in climate change discourse online (H6). However, climate-related online 
participation will not only depend on people’s climate-related communication behaviours, but 
also on their climate-related personal attributes, which must be taken into consideration to 
adequately explore the effects of communication on participation in climate discourse online. 
To do so, we will control for the effects of interest in climate politics, the personal relevance 
of climate change, and climate scepticism (see Figure 1). 
 
<< Insert Figure 1 here >> 
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Methods  
Sample 
The data used in this study originate from a three-wave online panel survey of German 
citizens conducted in the context of the UN Climate Conference hold in Paris in November 
2015. The respondents were recruited via a German online access panel of the professional 
external panel provider respondi, which is certified according to Global ISO 26362, and a 
member of ESOMAR and DGOF. The sample is supposed to be representative for the 
German population based on quotes for age, sex (crossed) and education. However, as 
variables on communication and online participation related to the climate summit were only 
assessed in the second wave, which was carried out during the climate conference (6th to 10th 
December 2015), the present study is based on cross-sectional data from respondents who 
participated in the second wave. In total 1,392 individuals (48% females; 52% males; M = 
46.4 years of age, SD = 13.4) provided valid data on the relevant variables examined on this 
study. 
 
Measures 
Media exposure and interpersonal conversation about COP21. People’s media exposure and 
interpersonal conversation regarding the climate summit in Paris were examined with nine 
items. Respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale (1 ‘never’ to 7 ‘several 
times a day’) how often they have recently received information on COP 21 from television 
news and informational programs (M = 4.1; SD = 1.6), printed newspapers and magazines (M 
= 2.6; SD = 1.8), online newspapers (M = 2.1; SD = 1,7), social network sites (M = 2.1; SD = 
1.8), Twitter (M = 1.4; SD = 1.1) and weblogs (M = 1.4; SD = 1.1). Moreover, using the same 
seven-point scale we asked participants how often they actively sought information on the 
climate summit 2015 online (M = 1.9; SD = 1.4) and third, how often they discussed the 
climate summit with family and friends (M = 2,4; SD = 1.6) and with colleagues (M = 2,1; SD 
= 1.5). For further analysis, a mean score for interpersonal conversations was calculated (M = 
2.2; SD = 1.4; Cronbach’s α = .87.  (see Supplementary Table 1) 
 
Participation in climate discourse online. The extent of people’s participation in climate 
discourse online in the context of the climate summit was captured with four items asking 
respondents to indicate on a seven-point scale (1 ‘never’ to 7 ‘several times a day’) how often 
they had evaluated, commented on, shared or published their own posts on climate 
change/politics (for descriptives, see Table 1). For further analysis, a mean score for 
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participation in climate discourse online was calculated (M = 1.5; SD = 1.1; Cronbach’s α = 
.95)  
<< Insert Table 1 here >> 
 
Control variables. Interest in climate politics was measured with one item asking respondents 
to indicate how strongly they are interested in climate politics on a five-point scale (1 ‘not 
strongly at all’ to 5 ‘very strongly’, (M = 3.2; SD = 1.0). Personal relevance of climate 
change was assessed with one item asking respondents to indicate how important the issue of 
climate change is for themselves on a five-point scale (1 ‘not important at all’ to 5 ‘very 
important’, M = 3.8; SD =1.0). Attitudes towards climate change were examined using the 
following four statements on a five-point likert scale (1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly 
agree’): ‘It is not certain that there is a long-term trend of global warming’ (M = 2.4; SD 
=1.2), ‘Scientists exaggerate the dangers of climate change’ (M = 2.4; SD = 1.1), ‘Human 
activities are the main cause of the current climate change’ (M = 3.8; SD = 1.1) and ‘Climate 
change has serious consequences for humans and nature’ (M = 4.2; SD = 0.9). For further 
analysis, we recoded items 3 and 4 and conducted a mean score for climate scepticism (M = 
2.2, SD = 0.9; Cronbach’s α = .80), where higher values indicate higher scepticism towards 
climate change. (see Supplementary Tables 2-4) 
  
Analysis strategy 
To test the hypotheses, a structural equation model (SEM) was calculated (maximum 
likelihood estimations) by using the Analysis of Moment Structures statistical software 
program (AMOS24). By means of this analytical approach, it was possible to analyse 
complex relationships between communication variables and participation in climate 
discourse online in the context of the climate summit. Moreover, we are able to estimate 
direct and indirect effects in one single model. As a starting point, we specified an SEM 
containing all paths postulated in our hypotheses and monitoring the effects of the control 
variables both on communication variables and online participation (see Figure 1).1 
                                                            
1 Structural equation modeling (SEM) is an extension of generalized linear models (GLM), which allows testing a 
set of regression equations simultaneously. The SEM presented in Figure 2 examines nine regression equations at 
once; one for each media variable, one for interpersonal communication, and one for participation in climate 
discourse online. Observed variables are symbolized by rectangles and the error variances respectively residuals 
by circles. The assumed direct effects of the variables on media and interpersonal communication as well as of the 
control variables are represented by single-headed arrows. The assumed correlations between the residuals of the 
media variables and the control variables are not displayed in Figure 1 for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility 
(see Supplementary Table 5).  
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Furthermore, we assumed that the control variables and the residuals on of the media 
variables are correlated. Considering the ratio of chi-square values and degrees of freedom 
(Chi² / df <3), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA<.06), and the 
comparative fit index (CFI >.95) as model fit indicators and presuming that model should not 
significantly differ from our data (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2011), the fit of the initial 
model was rather unsatisfactory. However, based on the modification indices, that 
externalized that some additional communication effects were missing in our initial model, we 
changed the model (see Figure 2) and could obtain a satisfactory model fit (Chi² / df = 2.06; 
RMSEA = .03, CFI = 1.0, p=.127).2 
Results  
Direct communication effects on participation in climate change discourse online 
The objective of the present study is to detect which factors drive people’s participation in 
climate change discourse online. The key findings that answer this question are presented in 
Figure 2. Most hypotheses were supported by the data. Individuals who more actively seek for 
information on the climate summit online show higher levels of online participation in climate 
change discourse (ß = .40; p < .001; H2). Likewise, those persons regularly receiving 
information on the COP21 from social network sites (ß = .15; p < .001), Twitter (ß = .08, p < 
.001) and weblogs (ß = .25; p < .001) are more strongly engaged in climate change discourse 
online (H3a, H3b and H3c). Moreover, people who more often discuss the climate conference 
also participate more frequently in climate change discourse online (ß = .18; p < .001; H4). In 
contrast, neither the direct effect of reading online newspapers (H1) nor the one of using print 
media (H4a) on online participation were supported by the data. Moreover, our data revealed 
a negative effect of watching televisions news; meaning that people receiving more 
information on the climate summit from television show lower levels of online participation 
(ß = -.05; p = .003).  
 
Indirect media effects on participation in climate change discourse online 
Besides direct effects, the results showed some indirect effects of media use on online 
participation through interpersonal conversation (see Table 2). As predicted by H4 and H5a, a 
higher intensity of climate change-related television exposure (ß = .02; p = .001) and print 
                                                            
2 Based on the modification indices we considered further effects of receiving information on COP21 from 
television news on online participation as well as from online media (active information seeking online, using 
social network sites, and weblogs) on interpersonal conversations.  
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media use (ß = .03; p = .001) leads to more online participation through interpersonal 
conversations about the climate summit. Based on the refined model (see the section on the 
analysis strategy), the present study further explored indirect effects of (1) actively seeking 
for information (ß = .07; p = .001), (2) receiving information on the COP21 from social 
network sites (ß = .02; p = .001), and (3) weblogs (ß = .02; p = .001) on online participation 
through interpersonal conversation (see Table 2).  
 
Effects of the personal position on participation in climate change discourse online 
Besides the effects of media exposure and interpersonal conversation, the findings provide 
some important insights into the critical role of the individuals’ position concerning climate 
change. In contrast to various studies that revealed positive effects of political interest on 
participation, the present research found a negative effect of interest in climate change 
politics. Thus, individuals who were more interested in climate change politics participated 
less often in climate change discourse online (ß = -.06; p < .008). Conversely, people with 
more sceptical attitudes towards climate change show higher levels of participation in climate 
change discourse online (ß = .08; p < .001). Overall, we were able to explain 68% of the 
variance in participation in climate change discourse online and 53% of the variance in 
interpersonal conversations about the COP21 by the suggested model (see Figure 2).  
 
Predictors of climate related communication behaviour (control variables) 
The SEM provided some further insights in the crucial role of interest in climate politics, 
personal relevance of climate change and climate sceptic attitudes as preconditions of climate-
related communication behaviours (Table 3): First, people who are more interested in climate 
politics overall communicate more frequently about the climate summits. This general 
positive effect was confirmed for the exposure to mass media (television (ß =.35, p <.001), 
print media (ß =.22, p <.001)), interpersonal conversation (ß =.12, p <.001), the use of online 
media ((online newspapers (ß =.23, p <.001), information seeking online (ß =.34, p <.001)) as 
well as the use of social media outlets ((social network sites (ß =.19, p <.001), Twitter (ß 
=.16, p <.001) and blogs (ß =.26, p <.001)). Second, people who perceive the issue of climate 
change as strongly relevant for themselves more often receive information from television (ß 
=.08, p =.023) and print media (ß =.09, p =.018) on the climate summit and more frequently 
seek information on COP21 online (ß =.14, p <.001). Third, people holding more sceptical 
attitudes towards climate change more often receive information on the climate summit from 
social media sources (social network sites (ß =.17, p <.001), Twitter (ß =.16, p <.001), 
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weblogs (ß =.20, p <.001)) and active information seeking online (ß =.13, p <.001). For 
climate sceptics, those ‘alternative sources’ even seem to be more relevant information 
sources than mainstream media sources (television (ß =.05, n.s.), print media (ß =.08, p <.01) 
and online newspapers (ß =.09, p <.003)). Additional findings on correlational relations are 
presented in the Supplementary Table 5).  
 
<< Insert Figure 2 here >> 
Discussion  
To face the challenges of global warming successfully, citizens must actively engage in public 
discourses on climate change and climate politics. While previous studies dealt with the 
growing importance of online media to encourage new forms of more self-expressive and 
individualized online engagement (e.g. Bennett, 2012; Hosch-Dayican, 2014; Rojas, 2010), 
very little is known about the factors affecting citizens’ participation in climate change 
discourse online (e.g. Taddicken & Reif, 2016). Against this background, the present study 
sought to explore the relationship between climate change-related communication (media, 
interpersonal) and online participation in in the context of climate summit that took place 
2015 in Paris. This study derived its hypotheses on communication effects on participation 
building upon outcomes from climate and political communication research (see Figure 1). To 
test these hypotheses, structural equation modelling was applied to data from a quantitative 
survey with a quota sample of 1,392 German citizens, which was conducted during the 
COP21 (see Figure 2).  
 
With respect to the effects of various communication variables, the results strongly supported 
previous research that there is an overall positive relationship between using the Internet for 
information and participation (e.g. Boulianne, 2009). Nevertheless, the strength of this effect 
appears to depend strongly on the mode of usage (i.e. active vs. passive) and the specific 
online platform. Actively seeking for information on the climate summit online had the 
strongest effect on online participation. Compared to that, the effect of the passive 
consumption of information provided by various media was small. Consistent with previous 
research on social media effects (e.g. Bode et al., 2014; Skoric et al., 2015), we found strong 
evidence that receiving information on the COP21 from social media outlets strongly 
encourages individuals’ participation in climate change discourse online. Overall, the effects 
are stronger for weblogs and social network sites than for Twitter. This finding may be 
explained by the nature and audience of these online outlets. Twitter is primarily used as a 
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communication channel by professionals such as journalists, politicians and representatives of 
non-governmental organizations which, at least in Germany, are only followed by a small 
number of people. Social network sites such as Facebook, however, are quite popular among 
the German population as they allow people to personally connect with others and to actively 
exchange and discuss stories and issues that matter to them. By contrast, issue-specific blogs 
provide their – often only a few – users with very specific, often alternative information and 
personal viewpoints on controversial issues such as climate change (e.g., the climate sceptic 
blog ‘Watts Up With That?’). Thus, a final evaluation of the effects of information received 
through social media channels is not possible without knowing more about the actual content.  
 
In addition, our results show that not only online media are important but also that 
interpersonal conversation and communication transported by mass media are significant 
drivers of online participation—either through a direct or an indirect relationship. First, our 
study strongly supports the findings of prior studies (e.g. Feldman et al., 2015; Roser-Renouf 
et al., 2014) that interpersonal conversations encourage climate change-related participation. 
Moreover, we found that receiving information on the COP21 from television and print media 
positively affects participation in climate change discourse online through interpersonal 
conversation. This finding supports the assumptions of the two-step flow model of 
communication (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). Similarly, we found indirect effects of (1) seeking 
for information online, (2) using social network sites and (3) weblogs through interpersonal 
conversation on online participation. In other words, people who more frequently receive 
information by actively seeking online, using social network sites and weblog are more likely 
to discuss their knowledge about the climate summit with their family, friends and colleagues. 
In turn, they are more likely to actively engage in online discourses on climate change. These 
results are backed by previous research demonstrating, that interpersonal discussions are 
important means to elaborate information conveyed by media (e.g., Trepte & Schmitt, 2017). 
This knowledge, people may gain in the context of political conversations and media 
exposure, in turn, may foster their confidence to participate effectively in the political process, 
which, in turn, is the pathway for active political participation (e.g., Schmitt, 2016). 
Moreover, this study revealed central effects of people’s interest in climate change politics 
and climate scepticism, which require some further interpretation. Our results show that 
participation in climate change discourse online is negatively affected by individuals’ interest 
in climate change politics, meaning that people who utter greater interest in climate change 
politics tend to participate less in online discourses. In contrast, people with more sceptical 
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attitudes towards climate change show a greater tendency to participate actively in online 
climate change discourse. One reasonable explanation refers to our   operationalization of 
participating in climate change discourse online that comprises evaluating, commenting, 
sharing and publishing own posts on climate change/politics—actions that in general are 
connected with rather low level of personal involvement. Recent research has shown that 
climate change skeptics are more likely to be actively apparent in online media than people 
who are less skeptical (e.g. Koteyko, Jaspal & Nerlich, 2013; Matthews, 2015; Sharman, 
2014). Thus, climate sceptics may feel that they need to make use of online media to 
encounter the public mainstream discourse by commenting on posts on climate change or 
publishing their own skeptic ideas, for example in weblogs. In this context, the corrective 
action hypothesis (Rojas, 2010) is a useful theoretical explanation. It states that people, who 
perceive the media as biased against their views (e.g., climate sceptics) and powerful to 
influence public opinion, are more likely to take discourse actions as they want to express 
their own opinions in order to correct the perceived hostile media bias and public opinion. 
Given the contextual situation of the climate change debate in Germany (see Schäfer, 2016), 
public discourse already reflects the views of those with a strong interest in—and high 
awareness of the problem of—climate change, as well as those being aware of the political 
movements seeking to combat global warming. Therefore, for people who are really 
interested in climate change and climate protection it seems plausible that they engage in 
other rather high-involvement forms of political engagement, e.g. adapting their consumer 
behavior or signing (online-)petitions. However, further research is needed to shed more light 
on this assumption.  
 
Overall, the results show that only a minority of the interviewed German citizens actively 
participate in climate change discourse online by evaluating, commenting, sharing, and 
publishing own posts (see Table 1). However, given that climate change skepticism has been 
found to be most apparent in online media—and the internet even has the power to rapidly 
spread questionable information (e.g, ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’)—even a few people are 
enough to influence and shape public discourse about climate change if they take on the role 
of digital opinion leaders. The question of whether participation in online climate change 
discourses have positive or negative consequences for public discourse about climate change 
and climate protection has to remain unanswered for now as we need more insights about the 
content, valence and quality of posts and arguments that are actually ‘liked’, posted, and 
shared by the people actively participating in the online discourse.  
16 
 
 
Despite the findings discussed above, this study has some methodological weaknesses that 
need to be acknowledged and that should be addressed in future research. First, climate 
summits are special points in time as they attract enormous political and media attention. 
Thereby, they might inspire more public engagement in climate change discourse. However, 
the crucial questions of whether annual climate summits have the potential to mobilize and 
increase more public online participation in climate change discourses and how long this 
mobilization lasts has to be answered using longitudinal data. This would allow researchers to 
go beyond the exploration of individual differences in the extent and character of online 
participation, and to examine changes on the individual-level of online participation in climate 
discourses over time. Likewise, future studies could explore whether changes in people’s 
participation in online climate change discourses might be triggered by ‘critical discourse 
moments . . . such as international summits or the launch of reports of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’ (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005, p. 1461–1462). Second, this study 
uses data from an online panel survey as therefore the willingness to actively engage in 
climate change discourses online and the effects of online media might be stronger than in a 
sample consisting of both “onliners” and “offliners”.  
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Figure 1. Research model with theoretical hypothesized effects 
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Figure 2. Results of the structural equation model for participation in climate discourse online 
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Table 1. Operationalization of Participation in Climate Discourse Online 
 
M (SD)1 never less several 
times  
a month 
at least once 
 a week2 
daily3  
Evaluating posts on 
climate change/politics 1.5 (1.2) 79% 10% 3% 7% 2% 
Commenting on posts on 
climate change/politics 1.5 (1.2) 80% 8% 4% 6% 2% 
Sharing posts on climate 
change/politics 1.5 (1.2) 78% 10% 3% 7% 2% 
Publishing one’s own 
posts on climate 
change/politics 
1.3 (1.0) 86% 6% 3% 4% 2% 
Notes: 1Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) on a 7-point scale of 1 ‘never’, 2 ‘less’, 3 ‘several times a 
month’, 4 ‘once a week’, 5 ‘several times a week’, 6 ‘daily’, 7 ‘several times a day’; 2 points 4 & 5 on the scale; 
3points 6 & 7 on the scale; n = 1.392 people. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Standardized Indirect Effects on Online Participation 
Standardized Indirect Effects  ß p 
participation in climate 
discourse online 
through evaluating, 
commenting on, 
sharing and publishing 
post on climate change/ 
politics  
 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .29 .001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .09 .01 
← climate scepticism (strong) .16 .01 
← information on COP21 from television .02 .001 
← information on COP21 from print media .03 .001 
← information seeking on COP21 online .07 .001 
← information on COP21 from social networks sites .02 .001 
← information on COP21 from weblogs .02 .001 
Notes: The significance of indirect effects has been assessed using bootstrapping in AMOS; reading example: The 
standardized indirect effect of receiving information on COP21 from television on participation in climate discourse 
online is significantly different from zero at the p=.001 level (one-sided). 
 
Table 3. Summary of Direct Effects of Controlling Variables on Media Communication  
standardized direct effects   ß p 
information on COP21  
from television 
(R2 = .15) 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .35 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .08 .023 
← climate scepticism (strong) .05 n.s. 
information on COP21  
from print media 
(R2 = .07) 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .22 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .09 .018 
← climate scepticism (strong) .08 .01 
information on COP21 
from online newspapers 
(R2 = .06) 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .23 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .07 n.s. 
← climate scepticism (strong) .09 .003 
information seeking  
on COP21 online  
(R2 = .15) 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .34 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .14 <.001 
← climate scepticism (strong) .13 <.001 
information on COP21 
 from social networks sites 
(R2 = .05) 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .19 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .06 n.s. 
← climate scepticism (strong) .17 <.001 
information on COP21 
 from Twitter  
(R2 = .04) 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .16 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .05 n.s. 
← climate scepticism (strong) .16 <.001 
information on COP21  
from weblogs 
← interest in climate politics (strong) .26 <.001 
← personal relevance of climate change (strong) .04 n.s. 
 (R2 = .07) ← climate scepticism (strong) .20 <.001 
Notes: n.s. = not significant  
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Supplementary Table 1. Operationalization of Media and Interpersonal Communication 
Variables 
 
M (SD)1 never less several times  
a month 
at least once 
 a week2 
daily3  
reception of information  
on COP21 from … 
television  4.1 (1.6) 7% 18% 8% 47% 21% 
print media 2.6 (1.8) 44% 19% 4% 23% 10% 
online newspapers 2.1 (1.7) 63% 12% 4% 16% 6% 
social networks sites 2.4 (1.9) 64% 11% 4% 10% 10% 
Twitter 2.1 (1.8) 86% 5% 2% 4% 3% 
weblogs 1.4 (1.1) 83% 7% 2% 6% 2% 
active information seeking 
online on COP21 1.9 (1.4) 63% 17% 6% 11% 3% 
interpersonal conversations  
about COP 21 with… 
family and friends 2.4 (1.6) 41% 26% 7% 22% 5% 
colleagues 2.1 (1.5) 54% 21% 7% 15% 4% 
Notes: 1Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) on a 7-point scale of 1 ‘never’, 2 ‘less’, 3 ‘several times a month’, 4 ‘once a 
week’, 5 ‘several times a week’, 6 ‘daily’, 7 ‘several times a day’; 2 points 4 & 5 on the scale; 3points 6 & 7 on the scale; 
n=1.392 people 
 
 
Supplementary Table 2. Operationalization of Interest in Climate Politics 
 
M (SD)1 not 
strongly 
at all (1) 
not very 
strong  
(2) 
somewhat 
strong 
 (3) 
rather 
strong  
(4) 
very 
strongly 
(5) 
How strong is your interest in politics in 
general? 3.2 (1.0) 6% 13% 45% 28% 8% 
Notes: 1Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) on a 5-point scale of 1 ‘not strongly at all’ to 5 ‘very strongly’.  
 
 
Supplementary Table 3. Operationalization of Personal Relevance of Climate Change Politics  
 
M (SD)1   not 
important 
at all (1) 
not very 
important 
(2) 
somewhat 
important 
(3) 
rather 
important 
4) 
very 
important
’ (5) 
How important to you are the problems 
due to climate change? 3.8 (1.2) 3% 7% 24% 40% 27% 
Notes: 1Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) on a 5-point scale of 1 ‘not important at all’ to 5 ‘very important’.  
Supplementary Table 4. Operationalization of Attitudes Towards Climate Change  
 
M (SD)1 strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
somewhat 
disagree 
(2) 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
(3) 
 
somewhat 
agree (4) 
strongly 
agree (5) 
It is not certain that there is a long-term 
trend of global warming. 2.4 (1.2) 27% 28% 26% 12% 7% 
Scientists exaggerate the dangers of 
climate change. 2.4 (1.1) 26% 32% 27% 11% 5% 
Human activities are the main cause of 
the current climate change 3.8 (1.1) 4% 7% 27% 27% 35% 
Climate change has serious 
consequences for humans and nature 4.2 (1.0) 1% 4% 19% 23% 53% 
Notes: 1Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) on a 5-point scale of 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’. 
 
Supplementary Table 5. Summary of Correlational Relations  
Correlational relations   r p 
interest in climate politics (strong) ← → climate scepticism (strong) -.37 <.001 
climate scepticism (strong) ← → personal relevance of climate change (strong) -.59 <.001 
interest in climate politics (strong) ← → personal relevance of climate change (strong) .59 <.001 
a1_television ← → a2_print media .35 <.001 
a1_television ← → a3_online newspapers .23 <.001 
a1_television ← → a4_information seeking online .16 <.001 
a1_television ← → a5_social networks sites .09 .001 
a1_television ← → a6_Twitter .07 .007 
a1_television ← → a7_weblogs .08 .002 
a2_print media ← → a3_online newspapers .32 <.001 
a2_print media ← → a4_ information seeking online .28 <.001 
a2_print media ← → a5_social networks sites .22 <.001 
a2_print media ← → a6_Twitter .28 <.001 
a2_print media ← → a7_weblogs .25 <.001 
a3_online newspapers ← → a4_ information seeking on COP21 online .41 <.001 
a3_online newspapers ← → a5_social networks sites .32 <.001 
a3_online newspapers ← → a6_Twitter .31 <.001 
a3_online newspapers ← → a7_weblogs .36 <.001 
a4_information seeking online ← → a5_social networks sites .45 <.001 
a4_information seeking online ← → a6_Twitter .43 <.001 
a4_information seeking online ← → a7_weblogs .51 <.001 
a5_social networks sites ← → a6_Twitter .50 <.001 
a5_social networks sites ← → a7_weblogs .49 <.001 
a6_Twitter ← → a7_weblogs .62 <.001 
 
